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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Henry Fegeley appeals the judgment of the 
district court, which reversed the judgment of the 
bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court determined that 
Fegeley's federal tax liabilities were dischargeable. Fegeley 
argues that in order to except federal taxes from discharge 
in bankruptcy pursuant to § 523(a)(1)(C) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the Government must demonstrate that he possessed 
a fraudulent intent. He asserts that willful failure to file 
timely tax returns for 1983, 1984, and 1985, and willful 
failure to timely pay his taxes for those years, is insufficient 
to support the conclusion that he willfully attempted to 
evade or defeat his taxes for those years. The Government 
argues that the district court was correct in finding that the 
willful failure of Fegeley to file tax returns, together with his 
willful failure to pay taxes despite his financial ability to do 
so, constitutes evasion under the Bankruptcy Code. The 
Government asserts that the district court correctly 
concluded that nondischargeability under § 523(a)(1)(C) 
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does not require a finding of fraudulent intent. We will 
affirm. 
 
Fegeley is a 50-year-old high school graduate who was 
employed as a salesman in the 1980s. He was paid both a 
salary and commission, and was also reimbursed for his 
expenses. Prior to the tax year 1983, Fegeley regularly filed 
his federal income tax returns and paid his tax liabilities, if 
any, in a timely manner. 
 
In the years 1983, 1984, and 1985, Fegeley's income 
increased substantially. During these years, Fegeley made 
lavish expenditures. He failed to file federal income tax 
returns or to pay the taxes owed for these years. At the 
time the taxes were due, he had sufficient funds on deposit 
in his bank accounts to pay his tax liability. 
 
Fegeley filed an application in 1985 for an extension of 
time to file his tax return with the IRS. In the application 
Fegeley substantially underestimated the amount of taxes 
owed. He also failed to pay the estimated tax liability when 
he returned the application. Also in 1985, Fegeley 
requested that his employer pay him as an independent 
contractor instead of as a salaried employee. His employer 
did so and, consequently, discontinued withholding taxes 
from Fegeley's income. 
 
Fegeley was communicated with by the Criminal 
Investigation Division of the IRS in 1987. After being 
communicated with the IRS agents, he filed his 1983, 1984, 
and 1985 income tax returns. The Government determined 
that the returns were reasonably accurate and complete, 
and has not alleged that any of the returns are fraudulent. 
 
In 1989, the Government filed a three-count information 
against Fegeley, charging him with willful failure to file his 
income tax returns for 1983, 1984, and 1985 pursuant to 
I.R.C. § 7203. Fegeley pled guilty to count three which 
related to the 1985 tax return. The remaining two counts 
were dismissed. 
 
Fegeley and his wife filed a joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition in 1991, and were thereafter granted a discharge in 
bankruptcy pursuant to § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code. In 
1992, the IRS demanded payment of income tax liabilities 
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for the years 1983, 1984, and 1985. On motion by Fegeley 
and his wife, the bankruptcy court reopened the 
bankruptcy proceeding and reimposed the automatic stay 
pursuant to § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Fegeleys 
then commenced the present adversary proceeding seeking, 
inter alia, a determination that the 1983, 1984, and 1985 
tax liability had been discharged in bankruptcy. 
 
The Government argued that the tax liability could not be 
discharged in bankruptcy because § 523(a)(1)(C) of the 
Bankruptcy Code prohibits discharge of taxes that the 
debtor willfully attempted to evade or defeat in any manner. 
The matter was tried before the bankruptcy court. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the bankruptcy court set forth its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The bankruptcy 
court stated that Fegeley "clearly knew that he had to file. 
He clearly neglected to file, failed to file, suffered criminal 
consequence[s] for his failure to file. And he failed to pay 
the taxes." App. at 14. The bankruptcy court also found 
that Fegeley "probably had enough money to pay th[e] 
taxes[,]. . . spent too much[,] . . . was much too lavish[, 
and] . . . didn't make good judg[ ]ments about the allocation 
of his resources." App. at 17. 
 
Despite these findings, the bankruptcy court entered 
judgment for the Fegeleys holding that the Government 
failed to prove that the Fegeleys attempted to evade or 
defeat their 1983-85 income taxes and that such taxes are 
not excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(1)(C).1 The 
bankruptcy court held that Fegeley's knowing failure to file 
income tax returns, in conjunction with his failure to pay 
those taxes even though he had the financial resources to 
do so, did not constitute an attempt to evade or defeat his 
tax liability for 1983, 1984 and 1985. 
 
The Government appealed the bankruptcy court's 
decision to the district court. The district court reversed, 
holding that the tax liabilities were not dischargeable under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The bankruptcy court found that there was "no support for the 
proposition that Mrs. Fegeley willfully attempted to evade or defeat the 
taxes." Supp. App. at 134. The Government did not appeal the 
bankruptcy court's order as it related to Mrs. Fegeley. Accordingly, this 
appeal relates only to the liability of Mr. Fegeley. 
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§ 523(a)(1)(C). In rendering its decision, the district court 
did not determine that the factual findings of the 
bankruptcy court were clearly erroneous. Indeed, the 
district court adopted the factual findings of the 
bankruptcy court. Rather, the district court held that the 
bankruptcy court erred as a matter of law by failing to 
conclude that Fegeley's intentional failure to file income tax 
returns when he was well aware of his obligation to do so, 
together with his failure to pay taxes when he had the 
resources to pay those taxes, was sufficient to prove that he 





Because the bankruptcy court, rather than the district 
court, was the trier of fact in this case, "[w]e are in as good 
a position as the district court to review the findings of the 
bankruptcy court, so we review the bankruptcy court's 
findings by the standards the district court should employ, 
to determine whether the district court erred in its review." 
Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 
102 (3d Cir. 1981). We review basic and inferred facts 
under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. We exercise 
plenary review over legal issues. In re Siciliano, 13 F.3d 
748, 750 (3d Cir. 1994). In reviewing ultimate facts, which 
are a "mixture of fact and legal precept", we must "break 
down" the questions of law and fact and "apply the 
appropriate standard to each component." Meridian Bank v. 
Alten, 958 F.2d 1226, 1229 (3d Cir. 1992)(quoting Universal 
Minerals, 669 F.2d at 102-03, and In re Sharon Steel Corp., 




When a debtor files under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the debtor is generally granted a discharge from all 
debts arising prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 
11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1994); see also In re Birkenstock, 87 
F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Toti, 24 F.3d 806, 808 
(6th Cir. 1994). The remedial purpose of the Bankruptcy 
Code is "to provide a procedure by which certain insolvent 
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debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their 
creditors, and enjoy `a new opportunity in life [and] a clear 
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of pre[-]existing debt."' Grogan v. Garner, 
498 U.S. 279, 286, 111 S.Ct. 654, 659 (1991) (quoting 
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244, 54 S.Ct. 695, 
699 (1934)). However, this "fresh start" policy provided by 
the Bankruptcy Code applies only to the "honest but 
unfortunate debtor." Id. at 286-87, 111 S.Ct. at 659 
(quoting Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244, 54 S.Ct. at 699). 
 
The Code excepts certain liabilities from discharge. 
Section 523(a)(1)(C) provides: 
 
(a) A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does 
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-- 
 
(1) for a tax or a customs duty-- 
 
(C) with respect to which the debtor made a 
fraudulent return or willfully attempted in any 
manner to evade or defeat such tax. 
 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C) (1994) (emphasis added). These 
exceptions to discharge are to be strictly construed in favor 
of the debtor. Dalton v. I.R.S., 77 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th 
Cir. 1996). Moreover, "the burden of proving that the 
debtor's tax liabilities are nondischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(1)(C) is on the United States." Berkery v. 
Commissioner, 192 B.R. 835, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 
111 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1997). The Government must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor made 
fraudulent returns or willfully attempted to evade his taxes. 
See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 291, 111 S.Ct. at 661. 
 
The Government does not allege that Fegeley filed 
fraudulent returns. The sole issue before us is whether 
Fegeley "willfully attempted . . . to evade or defeat" his 
income taxes for the tax years 1983, 1984, and 1985 within 
the meaning of the second part of § 523(a)(1)(C). 
 
Our analysis begins with an interpretation of the second 
prong of § 523(a)(1)(C). We must interpret provisions of "the 
Bankruptcy Code according to the plain meaning of [the] 
individual provision as long as the provision's language is 
unambiguous." Toti, 24 F.3d at 809 (citing United States v. 
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Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41, 109 S.Ct. 
1026, 1030 (1989)). "Where statutory language is not 
expressly defined, that language should be given its 
common meaning." Id. (citing Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 
1860 (1987)). "The plain language of the second part of 
§ 523(a)(1)(C) comprises both a conduct requirement (that 
the debtor sought `in any manner to evade or defeat' his tax 
liability) and a mental state requirement (that the debtor 
did so `willfully')." Birkenstock, 87 F.3d at 951 (quoting 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C)). 
 
Looking first to the conduct requirement, it is evident 
that "`Congress did not define or limit the methods by 
which a willful attempt to defeat and evade might be 
accomplished and perhaps did not define lest its effort to do 
so result in some unexpected limitation."' Dalton, 77 F.3d 
at 1301 (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499, 
63 S.Ct. 364, 368 (1943)). We must give weight to the fact 
that Congress included the phrase "in any manner" in the 
statute. Nonetheless, we should abide by the limitation set 
out by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in In 
re Haas, 48 F.3d 1153, 1158 (11th Cir. 1995):"[A] debtor's 
failure to pay his taxes, alone, does not fall within the 
scope of section 523(a)(1)(C)'s exception to discharge in 
bankruptcy." See also Dalton, 77 F.3d at 1301. Instead, we 
should look to nonpayment of taxes as "relevant evidence 
which [we] should consider in the totality of conduct to 
determine whether or not the debtor willfully attempted to 
evade or defeat taxes." Id. 
 
Although many of the published decisions excepting 
taxes from discharge under § 523(a)(1)(C) involve debtors 
who actually did engage in some type of affirmative conduct 
calculated to evade or defeat payment of their taxes, we 
observe that the majority of courts have found that 
affirmative conduct by a debtor designed to evade or defeat 
a tax is not required. Rather, § 523(a)(1)(C) encompasses 
acts of culpable omission as well as acts of commission. 
See, e.g., In re Bruner, 55 F.3d 195 (5th Cir. 1995); In re 
Toti, 24 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 1994). The Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit has held that "failure to file a tax return 
and failure to pay a tax fall within the definition in 
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§ 523(a)(1)(C) of a willful attempt to evade or defeat a tax 
liability." Toti, 24 F.3d at 809. The debtor in Toti, like the 
debtor in the instant case, "did not file federal income tax 
returns or pay federal income taxes, despite the fact he 
knew he was liable for the taxes and . . . had the 
wherewithal to pay his taxes during" at least some of the 
eight years in which he did not file. Id. at 807. Similar to 
Fegeley, Toti "was indicted on three counts of failing to file 
federal income tax returns." Id. He also pled guilty to one of 
the counts relating to one of the tax years, and the 
government dismissed the remaining two counts. Id. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that 
because Toti "had the wherewithal to file his return and pay 
his taxes, but . . . did not fulfill his obligation," he did "not 
fall within the category of honest debtors." Id. at 809. In the 
instant case, the bankruptcy court found that Fegeley 
"clearly knew that he had to file. He clearly neglected to file, 
failed to file, suffered criminal consequence[s] for his failure 
to file. And he failed to pay the taxes." App. at 14. The 
bankruptcy court also found that Fegeley "probably had 
enough money to pay th[e] taxes[,]. . . spent too much[,] . 
. . was much too lavish[, and] . . . didn't make good 
judg[ ]ments about the allocation of his resources." App. at 
17. 
 
Based upon the factual findings of the bankruptcy court, 
the district court correctly held that Fegeley's intentional 
failure to file his tax returns, together with his failure to 
pay taxes when he had the resources to do so, was 
sufficient to prove that he attempted to evade or defeat his 
tax liabilities for the tax years at issue. By adopting this 
rule of law, we need not address the remaining factual 
findings of the bankruptcy court. Therefore, we need not 
evaluate other conduct of Fegeley, such as underestimation 
of tax liability by 50% and changing of filing status from 
that of employee to independent contractor, which more 
properly may have been construed as affirmative steps in a 
scheme to evade taxes. 
 
We now turn to the required mental state. Fegeley argues 
that the willfulness language in the second prong of 
§ 523(a)(1)(C) should be interpreted consistently with the 
criminal provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, and that 
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"proof of fraud is a necessary element of [that prong]." 
Appellant's Br. at 15. He argues that "such fraud be proved 
by `badges of fraud' whether they be in the form of 
affirmative acts or culpable omissions." Id. 
 
The majority of courts to address this issue have not 
required any such showing. Instead, they have adopted the 
test for "civil willfulness." In doing so, they "have 
interpreted `willfully,' for purposes of § 523(a)(1)(C), to 
require that the debtor's attempts to avoid his tax liability 
were `voluntary, conscious, and intentional."' Birkenstock, 
87 F.3d at 952 (quoting Toti, 24 F.3d at 808); see also 
Dalton, 77 F.3d at 1302; Bruner, 55 F.3d at 199. Thus, to 
prevail, the Government need establish only that: 
 
(1) [the] debtor had a duty to file income tax returns; 
 
(2) [the] debtor knew he had such a duty; and 
 
(3) [the] debtor voluntarily and intentionally violated 
that duty. 
 
In re Semo, 188 B.R. 359, 362 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995); see 
also Bruner, 55 F.3d at 197. 
 
It is undisputed that Fegeley had a duty to file tax 
returns. The bankruptcy court found that he knew that he 
had this duty and voluntarily failed to file his returns. App. 
at 12, 14. The bankruptcy court also found that Fegeley 
"should have paid [his] taxes . . . [and] probably had 
enough money to pay those taxes." App. at 17. The 
bankruptcy court erred by concluding that § 523(a)(1)(C) 
"requires more," i.e., that the Government demonstrate a 
"failure to report income, transfer of assets,[or] falsification 
of records" by the debtor. Id. 
 
Fegeley had a duty under the tax law, knew he had that 
duty, and voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. 
He also had the financial ability to discharge that duty. The 
district court correctly found this to be a sufficient basis to 
prove that Fegeley willfully attempted to evade or defeat his 




We will affirm the May 10, 1996, judgment of the district 
court reversing the bankruptcy court's August 7, 1995, 
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order. The case will be remanded to the district court with 
instructions to remand the matter to the bankruptcy court 
with a direction that the bankruptcy court enter an order 
denying the application by Fegeley that his tax liability for 
1983, 1984, and 1985 be discharged. 
 
Costs taxed against appellant. 
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